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ABSTRACT
As an important type of cloud data, digital provenance is arousing increasing attention on improving
system performance. Currently, provenance has been employed to provide cues regarding access
control and to estimate data quality. However, provenance itself might also be sensitive informa-
tion. Therefore, provenance might be encrypted and stored in the Cloud. In this paper, we provide a
mechanism to classify cloud documents by searching specific keywords from their encrypted prove-
nance, and we prove our scheme achieves semantic security. In term of application of the proposed
techniques, considering that files are classified to store separately in the cloud, in order to facilitate
the regulation and security protection for the files, the classification policies can use provenance as
conditions to determine the category of a document. Such as the easiest sample policy goes like: the
documents have been reviewed twice can be classified as ”public accessible”, which can be accessed
by the public.
Keywords Cloud Storage · Integrity · Data Privacy · Third Party Auditing · Offline Guessing
Attack.
1 Introduction
The definition of provenance in the Oxford English Dictionary is: (1) the fact of coming from the particular source
or quarter; origin, derivation; (2) the history or pedigree of a work of art, manuscript, rare book, etc.; concretely,
a record of the ultimate derivation and passage of an item through its various owners. In computer systems, the
provenance of data refers to the logs of the processes and operations of the data, which is relevant to its sources and
origins. Provenance can be expressed as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), illustrating how a data artifact is processed
by an execution. In such a DAG of provenance under the Open Provenance Model (OPM)[18], nodes present three
main entities including Artifact, Agent and Process and edges represent connections to the main entities.
Data provenance records historical operations performed on documents, preserving its security and privacy. Prove-
nance Access Control is considered a crucial research topic for big data security. The sensitivity of files and their
provenance can be different, and users can request, and be granted, access to files and provenance separately. In some
situations, provenance itself may consist of sensitive information which might require more protection than its attached
document. For instance, although a programming project can be published to the public, its authors and executed op-
erations should be kept as a secret, to prevent leaking the techniques. Therefore, access control to the provenance data
itself is required. It allows eligible users to access the provenance data and protects it from unauthorised access.
A number of proposals for access control based on the provenance of the data have been made in some papers[19][21].
In terms of access control, characteristics such as data accuracy, timeliness and the path of transfer of data can be
crucial restrictions of a policy. With increasing regulation, the consequences for signing incorrect statements have
significantly increased, even if the signer was not directly responsible for the invalid sections. Therefore it is important
to track which entities were responsible for the process that led to the final form of the data.
∗Corresponding author
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
01
94
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 Ja
n 2
02
0
The application of the technique proposed in this paper is that data are classified based on its provenance, in order to
facilitate the data management and maintain. Admittedly, processes performed on data can provide clues to identify
the vulnerability of data. In this system, we assume that date was performed under same or similar operations should
be classified as a category. The access control should be performed based on the classification. For example, if data
was collected by policemen for the purpose of detection, the collected data can be identified as very sensitive data. It
was labeled as “sensitive class”, and its privacy should be protected carefully. The possible protection methods might
include generating restricted access policies and encrypt it.
2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the approach where the data carries with it provenance information which can be used
to make access control decisions. A generic representation is sufficiently extensible to capture the essence of the
semantics of provenance across various domains. If such a representation can be captured in a secure manner, then it
will be useful in tackling the issue of attribution of data as it moves around the cloud. For instance, information about
the origin of data together with the conditions and the state under which it was created along with the modifications
that have been made and the conditions under which these modifications have been made will allow the access control
service to more robustly make security decisions. Such an approach would transform the access control service to a
more stateful decision and make it more context-dependent.
In cloud storage systems, to provide appropriate management and security protection, files could be stored in separate
units. While each unit keeps a category of files, classifying files as categories is an effective mechanism for organising
files and management access to files. In this paper, we focus on classifying files according to provenance which records
generating a process of files. Specifically, our system identifies and classifies files by their own preferences based on
which process worked on which files. For example, when medical records or governmental survey documents are
anonymised, it removes sensitive personal information. Then, these files could be accessed by the public, students,
and scholars for the purpose of research. Therefore, it identifies files after anonymization as “public education”. On
the contrary, if files are combined with judgment or comments with sensitive agents, they might wish to keep these
files secure from access to with the public or attackers. Then these files are classified as “sensitive information”
and take a higher level protection and deny access from unauthorised users. However, the third party to execute
classification might not be fully trustworthy either. To prevent an internal attack and retain confidentiality of data, we
hope to keep data information confidential by encryption as well as classification them. We provide a provenance-
based classification system to implement this goal. In this system, we propose a scheme to search keywords from
encrypted provenance. When specific keywords are found, files are classified by according system policies.
In particular, our paper makes the following contributions:
• Allowing the policy decision server to check the encrypted provenance without decrypting the provenance,
while at the same time;
• Providing guarantees to the policy decision server that the provenance is from a genuine source and is linked
with the particular data or file.
Such a solution will enable authenticated and confidential provenance information to be used in the access control
service without revealing its plain content. To achieve such a solution, we introduce a new notion of Encrypted
Provenance Search Scheme (EPSS). EPSS is based on the searchable encryption method proposed by Boneh et al.[6].
2.1 Paper Organization
The organisation of this paper is as follows.
• Section 2 briefly presents some research works in the areas of provenance and encrypted search that are
relevant to our work.
• Section 3 gives a brief introduction to the representation of provenance and its characteristics.
• Section 4 presents our Provenance-based Classification Access Policy (PBCAP) and system architecture,
which is followed by preliminaries in section 5.
• Section 6 proposes the Provenance-based Classification Scheme
• Section 7 presents semantic-secure game for it and proves that this scheme is semantic secure.
• Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and states the anticipated future work.
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2.2 Related Work
Data provenance might be around sensitive information and in those cases, the security of provenance (for example [7],
[1] and [15]) has aroused increasing attention. There are several attempts to encrypt provenance information to keep
its confidentiality. Li et al.[16] proposed a provenance-aware system based on Attribute-based signature (ABS) which
supports fine-grained access control policies. The users’ privacy is also protected because attribute private key of users
is issued with an anonymous key-issuing protocol from multiple attribute authorities. However, the whole computation
is built on the assumption that the server has a large computational ability. Chow et al. [8] propose a cryptographic
design for cloud storage systems supporting dynamic users and provenance data. These encryption schemes could
contribute the system we proposed in this paper, however, our contribution focus on serving the classification policies.
In the area of encrypted data search, Boneh [4] presents a Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PKES)
scheme. We will be making use of this work in the design of our Provenance-based Classification Access scheme.
Essentially, the work in paper [4] considers the following scenario: when Alice receives emails, she would like to
set a gate that helps her to check whether the incoming emails contains certain sensitive keywords such as “urgent”.
However, the emails are encrypted to protect privacy. As the gateway is not fully trusted, Alice does not want to grant
the gateway the ability to decrypt her emails. The PKES scheme enables the gateway to conduct a test to verify if the
encrypted emails contain the keywords while learning nothing else about the content of the emails themselves.
3 System Architecture and the Policies
3.1 System Architecture
We assume that a cloud service provider has several remote storage units available for the storing data that is received
from different users of the system. Users wish to store their files with provenance in the cloud and send them in an
encrypted format to the cloud service provider. The goal is to design an access control system that the cloud service
provider can use to classify encrypted files by searching keywords from encrypted provenance. We refer to this access
control system as a Provenance-based Classification Access Policy (PBCAP) System.
Figure 1 gives an outline of our system architecture. The remote data storage units are managed by a cloud server
which classifies files and allocates them in corresponding storage units. Our PBCAP system achieves the following
objectives: (1) the cloud server will classify the encrypted files that it receives from users based on the attached
encrypted provenance information; (2) the encrypted provenance information is checked for policy compliance while
they remain encrypted (hence the confidentiality of both the encrypted files and their provenance information are
guaranteed); and (3) provides a guarantee to the cloud server that the provenance is from a genuine source.
Figure 1: PBCAP System Architecture
The components of the system architecture are as follows:
• Users are the owners of files who send encrypted files to the cloud server for storage. The files along with
their provenance are encrypted by the user before they are sent to the cloud server. In our scheme, users
also generate a pair of public and private keys which are used for an embedded short signature verification
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mechanism.
• Cloud Server classifies the received encrypted files and stores them in different storage units. Each unit
stores a number of files that share common attributes. For instance, an attribute might be undergoing a
specific process (e.g. being graded by Alice, or being edited by Bob). This benefits management of files as
well as providing corresponding levels of security protections.
• Policy Administrator Point (PAP) generates policies and sends them to Policy Decision Points (PDP) for
implementation. To keep confidentiality, PAP encrypts sensitive information in policies before sending them
to PDP.
• PDP Executes Encrypted Provenance Search Scheme (EPSS) as per the following the steps: verifying short
signatures of provenance ciphertexts to make sure they are from genuine users; searching keywords from
encrypted provenance and output results to Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).
• PEP receives results from PDP and allocates files to corresponding storages units.
3.2 Provenance-based Classification Policy
Provenance-based classification policies classify files based on their provenance. Namely, each policy defines that files
executed by a given of operations can be classified as one category. Hence, a policy maps a set of provenance partitions
to a category. In terms of the motivation, operations performed on data can reveal its sensitivity and vulnerability.
Hence, we employ provenance partitions as keywords to classify data.
To avoid conflict, we define different priorities for the classification policies. We give an example policy as
below showing that if the provenance of a document includes any provenance partitions in the given set including
RecordedBy (Test, Nurse), DiagnosedBy (Report, Doctor), the document will be classified as a medical document.
Further, it will be stored in Hospital Storage unit which can only be accessed by staff and patients from the hospital.
Particularly, the priority is Pi of this policy, which implies that when a provenance consists of keywords in policy
ID=1 and other policies, the data connected with the provenance should be classified as a category of policy with the
highest priority among them.
Algorithm 1 Policy
<Policy ID = “1” >
<Typed Provenance Set> RecordedBy (Test, Nurse),
DiagnosedBy (Report, Doctor)
</Typed Provenance Set>
<Priority> Pi </Priority>
<Category> “Medical Documents” </Category>
<Cloud Storage Unit> “Hospital”</Cloud Unit>
</Policy>
3.3 Public-Key Encryption
Diffie and Hellman [10] introduced new research directions in cryptography called public-key cryptography (PKC)
where two parties can communicate over public channels without compromising the security of the system.
A public-key (asymmetric) encryption (PKE) scheme is a public-key cryptographic scheme used to protect the confi-
dentiality of the transferred messages. In a PKE scheme, a secret public key pair is generated. Notably, it is computa-
tionally infeasible to obtain the secret key from the public key. This is in contrast with a symmetric encryption scheme
where both the decryption key and the encryption key are same or it is easy to compute one from the other.
The formal definition of a PKE scheme is as follows [10]. A PKE scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
• Setup (1`)→ params. The setup algorithm takes as input 1` and outputs the public parameters params.
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• KeyGen (1`)→ (SK,PK). The key generation algorithm takes as input 1` and outputs a secret-public pair
KG(1`)→ (SK,PK).
• Enc (ps, PK,M)→ CT. The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the public
key PK and a message M , and outputs a ciphertext CT .
• Dec (params, SK,CT )→M. The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the
secret key SK and the ciphertext CT , and outputs the message M .
Definition 1. Correctness. We say that a public-key encryption scheme is correct if
Pr
 Setup(1`)→ ps;Dec(ps, SK,CT )→M KeyGen(1`)→ (SK,PK);
Enc(ps, PK,M)→ CT
 = 1
where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by all algorithms in the scheme.
Security Model. The standard notion of the security for a PKE scheme is called indistinguishability against adap-
tively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2)[22]. This model is defined by the following game executed between a
challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. C runs Setup (1`) to generate the public parameters params and sends them to A.
• KeyGen. C runs KeyGen (1`) to generate the secret-public key pair (SK,PK) and sends the public key
PK to A.
• Phase 1. A can adaptively query the decryption oracle. A submits a ciphertext CT to C, where CT =
Enc(param,PK,M). C runs Dec (params, SK,CT ) and responds A with M . This query can be made
multiple times.
• Challenger. A submits two messages M0 and M1 with equal length. C randomly selects Mb and computes
CT ∗ = Enc(params, PK,Mb), where b ∈ {0, 1}. C responds A with CT ∗.
• Phase 2. A can adaptively query the decryption oracle. A submits a ciphertext CT to C, where the only
restrict is CT 6= CT ∗. Phase 1 is repeated. This query can be made multiple times.
• Guess. A outputs his guess b′ on b. A wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 2. IND-CCA2. We say that a public-key encryption scheme is (T, q, (`))-indistinguishable against adap-
tive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if no PPT adversaryA making q decryption queries can win the game with
the advantage
AdvIND−CCA2A =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≥ (`)
in the above model.
Another security notion for public-key encryption is called indistinguishability against adaptively chosen plaintext
attacks (IND-CPA). In this model, the adversaryA is not allowed to query the decryption oracle. The formal definition
of this model is as follows.
Definition 3. IND-CPA. We say that a public-key encryption scheme is (T, (`))-indistinguishable against adaptive
chosen plaintex attacks (IND-CPA) if no PPT adversary A who is restricted to query the decryption oracle can win
the game with the advantage
AdvIND−CPAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≥ (`)
in the above model.
Some well known PKE schemes include the ElGamal encryption scheme [11], RSA encryption scheme [23], Cramer-
Shoup encryption scheme [9] and RSA-OAEP encryption scheme [12].
3.4 Digital Signature
Digital signature was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [10]. It is the electronic version of a handwritten signature. A
valid digital signature can convince a verifier that it was generated by a known party for a public message. Especially,
a digital signature can provide non-repudiation property, namely, a signer cannot deny he has generated the signature.
A digital signature scheme is formally defined as follows [13]. It consists of the following four algorithms.
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• Setup (1`)→ params. The setup algorithm takes as input 1` and outputs the public parameters ps.
• KeyGen (1`)→ (SK,PK). The key generation algorithm takes as input 1` and outputs a secret-public key
pair (SK,PK).
• Sign (ps, SK,M) → σ. The signature algorithm takes as input the public parameters ps, the secret ky SK
and a message M , and outputs a signature σ on M .
• Verify (ps,M,PK, σ) → True/False. The verification algorithm takes as input the public parameters ps,
the message M , the public key PK and the signature σ, and outputs True if Sign (ps,M, SK) → σ;
otherwise, it outputs False.
Definition 4. Correctness. We say that a digital signature is correct if
Pr
 Setup(1`)→ ps;V(ps,M,PK, σ)→ T KeyGen(1`)→ (SK,PK);
Sign(ps, SK,M)→ σ.
 ≥ 1− (`)
and
Pr
 Setup(1`)→ ps;V(ps,M,PK, σ)→ F KeyGen(1`)→ (SK,PK);
Sign(ps, SK,M)→ σ.
 < (`)
where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by all algorithms in the scheme.
Security Model. A digital signature scheme should achieve the traditional security called existential unforgeability
under adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) [13]. This model is formally defined by the following game
executed between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. C runs Setup (1`) to generate the public parameters params and sends them to A.
• KeyGen. C runs KeyGen (1`) to generate a secret-public pair (SK,PK) and sends PK to A.
• Query. A can adaptively query the signature oracle. A sends a message M to C. C runs Sign
(params, SK,M) to generate a signature σ on M and responds A with σ. This query can be made multiple
times.
• Output. A outputs a message-signature pair (M∗, σ∗). A wins the game if M∗ has not been used to query
the signature oracle and Verify (params,M∗, PK, σ∗)→ True.
4 Provenance-based Classification Scheme
In this section, we describe our provenance-based classification scheme. After a brief overview of preliminaries needed
for our scheme, we provide details of our scheme which consists of setup phase and verification phase. Finally, after
presenting the security game of a chosen-word-attack, we give the security proof of our scheme showing that it is
semantically secure in the next section.
4.1 Algorithms
Let G1,G2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same order p. The size of G1,G2 is determined by the
security parameter. Let eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: eˆ(ga1 , gb2) = eˆ(g1, g2)ab for all {g1, g2} ∈ G1, {a, b} ∈ Zq .
• Non-degeneracy: There exists g ∈ G1 such that eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(g1, g2) for all {g1, g2} ∈ G1.
The construction of the Provenance-based Classification Scheme is based on identity-based encryption [6]. We build
a non-interactive searchable encryption scheme from the Bilinear map above and hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1
and H2 : G2 → {0, 1}log p. In particular, H2 is a collision resistant hash function. The functions in scheme work as
follows:
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• KeyGen1: Takes a security parameter 1λ as input; then the algorithm picks at random an α ∈ Z∗p
and a generator g ∈ G1, where p is a prime and it is the size of G1 and G2. It outputs the public key
Apub = [g, h1 = g
α] and the private key Apriv = α.
• KeyGen2: Takes a security parameter 1λ as input; then the algorithm picks at random a β ∈ Z∗p and
a generator g ∈ G1, where p is a prime and it is the size of G1 and G2. It outputs the public key
Bpub = [g, h2 = g
β ] and the private key Bpriv = β.
• PBCT (Apub,Bpriv): Generates a Provenance-based Classification Tags (PBCTs) for provenance fragments
for the purpose of searching. Then Computes t = eˆ(H1(P)β , hr1) ∈ G2 for a random r ∈ Z∗p and a
provenance fragment P . Output PBCT (Apub, β) = [hβ1 , hr2, H2(t)] ≡ [X,Y, Z].
• T rapdoor (Apriv): Output TP = H1(P ′)α ∈ G1, where P ′ is provenance fragments chosen by the
administrator PAP.
• Test (Apub, Bpub, TP , S): Test if H2(eˆ(TP , Y )) = Z and eˆ(X, g) = eˆ(h1, h2). If both are true, output 1;
otherwise 0. The test function using Apub, Bpub checks if the encrpyted provenance matching TP satisfies
the policies; it also verifies if the provenance is generated by authenticated users by checking the short
signature.
4.2 Schemes
Our policy-based classification scheme as shown in the figure below has two phases, namely the setup phase and the
verification phase. Initially, in the setup phase, both the administrator PAP and users generate their own pair of public
and private keys. Then PAP calculates Trapdoor for sets of provenance fragments listed in the access control policies
and sends them with policies to PDP which executes the test function. In the verification phase, before users send
encrypted files and provenance to the Cloud Server, they calculate PBCT and attach them to the files. After receiving
files, the PDP classifies them by running the Test function. Our scheme involves an encrypted provenance search and
is constructed using the technique mentioned in [4].
• Setup Phase:
– PAP runs KeyGen1, taking an input security parameter 1λ; the algorithm picks a random α ∈ Z∗p and a
generator g ∈ G1. It outputs the public key Apub = [g, h1 = gα] and the private key Apriv = α. Then
PAP sends the public keys to users and PDP.
– Users run KeyGen2 taking an input security parameter 1λ; the algorithm picks a random β ∈ Z∗p and a
generator g ∈ G1. It outputs the public key Bpub = [g, h2 = gβ ] and the private key Bpriv = β. Then,
users send public keys to PDP.
– PAP runs Trapdoor (Apriv) to output TP′ = H1(P)α ∈ G1, and then sends the policies with TP to
PDP.
• Verification Phase:
– Users run function PBCT (Apub,Bpriv) to compute tags where t =
eˆ(H1(P)β ,hr1)∈ G2 for a random r ∈ Z∗p and a provenance P . Output PBCT(Apub, β) =
[hβ1 , h
r
2, H2(t)] ≡ [X,Y, Z]. Users then attach the tags with encrypted files and provenance.
– When the encrypted files with tags are sent to PDP, PDP checks if the provenance has the speci-
fied keywords in the policies, by running the Test function. Test if eˆ(X, g) ?= eˆ(h1, h2) (1) and
H2(eˆ(TP , Y ))
?
= Z(2). If both are true, then output 1; otherwise 0. The result will then be sent to PEP
which executes further operations.
In formula (1), the left hand side eˆ(X, g) = eˆ(hβ1 , g) = eˆ(h1, g
β), according to the property of the Bilinear Map.
By definition h2 = gβ , and hence the left-hand side equals the right-hand side. This formula verifies if the users
are authenticated by checking whether they have the corresponding private keys. Similarly, we also prove that the
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Users PDP PAP
Run KeyGen2 Run KeyGen1
Send Bpub to PDP
Bpub−−−−→ Apub←−−−− Send Apub to PDP,Users
Run Trapdoor
TP←−−−− and send it to PDP
Calculate PBCT
Send E(f)||PBCT to PDP E(f)||PBCT−−−−−−−−−→
Run Test and Output Result
Figure 2: Provenance-based Classification Scheme
left-hand side equals the right-hand side in formula (2). It tests if PBCT matches the chosen provenance fragments
specified by the administrator.
H2(eˆ(TP , Y ))
?
= Z (2)
H2(eˆ(H1(P)α, hr2)) ?= H2(eˆ(H1(P)β , hr1))
H2(eˆ(H1(P), hαr2 )) ?= H2(eˆ(H1(P), hβr1 ))
H2(eˆ(H1(P), (gβ)αr)) ?= H2(eˆ(H1(P), (gα)βr))
5 Complexity Assumptions
5.0.1 Discrete Logarithm Assumption
The discrete logarithm (DL) assumption [20] in a finite field is one of the basic assumptions in cryptography research.
The DL assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 5. (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [20].) Let G(1`)→ (p,G) and G = 〈g〉. Given (g, y) ∈ G2, we
say that the discrete logarithm assumption holds on G if no PPT adversaryA can compute a x ∈ Zp such that y = gx
with the advantage
AdvDLA = Pr [y = g
x|A(p, g, y,G)→ x] ≥ (`)
where the probability is taken over the random choice of y ∈ G and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
5.1 Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Diffie and Hellman [10] proposed this assumption and constructed a key exchange scheme based on it. This assumption
is defined as follows.
Definition 6. (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption [10].) Let x, y R← Zp, G(1`)→ (p,G) andG = 〈g〉.
Given (g, gx, gy), we say that the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on G if no PPT adversary A can
compute gxy with the advantage
AdvCDHA = Pr [A(g, gx, gy)→ gxy] ≥ (`)
where the probability is taken over the random choices of x, y R← Zp and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
Maurer [17] discussed the relationships between DL assumption and CDH assumption.
5.2 Decisional Diflie-Hellman Assumption
Boneh [2] surveyed the various applications of decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and demonstrated some results
regarding it security.
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Definition 7. (Decisional Diflie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption [2].) Let x, y, z R← Zp, G(1`) → (p,G) and G = 〈g〉.
Given (g, gx, gy), we say that the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on G if no PPT adversary A can
distinguish (X,Y, Z) = (gx, gy, gxy) from (X,Y, Z) = (gx, gy, gz) with the advantage
AdvDDHA = |Pr[A(X,Y, gxy) = 1]− Pr[A(X,Y, gz) = 1]| ≥ (`)
where the probability is taken over the random choices x, y, z R← Zp and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
5.3 Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Boneh and Franklin [5] introduced this assumption. This assumption is as follows.
Definition 8. (Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) Assumption [5]) Let GG(1`)→ (e, p,G,GT ) andG =
〈g〉. We say that the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on (e, p,G,GT ) if no PPT adversaries
A can compute e(g, g)abc from (A,B,C) = (ga, gb, gc) with the advantage
AdvCBDHA = Pr
[A(A,B,C)→ e(g, g)abc] ≥ (`)
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b, c R← Zp and the bits consumed by A.
5.4 Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Boneh and Franklin [5] introduced this assumption and used it to construct an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme.
This assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 9. (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption [5]) Let a, b, c, z R← Zp, GG(1`) →
(e, p,G,GT ) and G = 〈g〉. We say that the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on (p, e,G,GT ) if
no PPT adversaryA can distinguish (A,B,C,Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) from (A,B,C,Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z)
with the advantage
AdvDBDHA =
∣∣Pr[A(A,B,C, e(g, g)abc) = 1]− Pr[A(A,B,C, e(g, g)z) = 1]∣∣ ≥ (`)
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b, c, z R← Zp and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
5.5 Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption [14] is defined as follows.
Definition 10. (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption [14]) Let x, y, z R← Zp, GG(1`)→ (e, p,G1, G2, GT )
and Gb = 〈gb〉 for any b ∈ {1, 2}. We say that the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption holds on
(p, e,G1, G2, GT ) if no PPT adversary A can distinguish (gb, gxb , gyb , gxyb ) from (gb, gxb , gyb , gzb ) with the advantage
AdvSXDHA = |Pr[A(gb, gxb , gyb , gxyb ) = 1]− Pr[A(gb, gxb , gyb , gzb ) = 1]| ≥ (`)
where the probability is taken over the random choices of x, y, z R← Zp and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
6 Security Proof
Let us now consider the security proof. This scheme has the property of semantic security against a chosen word
attack. That is, PBCT does not reveal any information of provenance to PDP except that TP is available to PDP. By
simulating our scheme with the game below, an active attacker can obtain TP for any provenance fragment that they
choose. However, the attacker could not distinguish PBCT for P0 and P1 for which it does not know the TP .
We define the security game between an attacker and the challenger as follows:
Provenance-based Classification Security Game:
1. The challenger runs KeyGen1 and KeyGen2 functions to obtain Apub, Apriv and Bpub, Bpriv . The chal-
lenger then sends Apub and Bpub to the attacker.
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2. The attacker sends provenance fragments P ∈ {0, 1}∗ of its choice to the challenger. Then the attacker
receives trapdoor TP calculated by the challenger.
3. Then, the attacker sends two random provenance fragments P0 and P1 for which it did not ask previously
TP .
4. The challenger chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1}, and returns C= PBCT (Apub, Bpriv , Pb) to the attacker.
5. The attacker can continue to retrieve TP from the challenger of any random provenance fragment as long as
it is neither P0 nor P1.
6. Finally, the attacker makes a guess for b ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b′ = b.
We define the attacker’s advantage to break the Provenance-based Classification Scheme as
Adv(s) = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|
To complete the security proof, we define an External Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem. We use the CorollaryA.3.
in [3] to get a new hard problem by setting P = (1, a, b, c, d, ab, bc), Q = (1), f = abcd.
Corollary A.3. in [3]. Let P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, .., Xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variable polynomials over Fp and let
f ∈ Fp[X1, ...Xn]. Let d = max(2dp, dQ, df ). If f is independent of (P, Q) then any A that has advantage 1/2 in
solving the decision (P,Q,f)-Diffie-Hellman Problem in a generic bilinear group G must take time at least Ω(
√
p/d−s).
External Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (XBDH) Let eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map. For a generator g of
G1, the BDH problem is as follows: given {g, ga, gb, gc, gd, gab, gbc} ∈ G1 as input, compute eˆ(g, g)abcd.
Theorem 1: The Provenance-based Classification Scheme given above is semantically secure against a chosen-word-
attack in the random oracle model if the XBDH problem is hard.
Proof: Suppose the attacker makes at most q1 hash function queries to H2 and at most q2 trapdoor queries. Assume
the attack algorithm has an advantage of  in breaking the scheme. Then the challenger is able to solve the XBDH
problem with an advantage ′ = /(eq1q2). We know, in G1, XBDH is a hard problem and ′ is negligible. Therefore,
 must be negligible and the Provenance-based Classification protocol is semantic-secure.
We simulate the game between the attacker A and the challenger B. The challenger is given g, u1 = gα, u2 = gβ ,
u3 = g
γ , u4 = gδ , u5 = gαβ , u6 = gβγ . The goal of the challenger is to successfully output v = e(g, g)αβγδ . The
attacker wins the game if it is able to distinguish PBCT (P0) and PBCT (P1).
KeyGen: Challenger sends public keys [g, u1, u2] to attacker A.
H1-queries: At anytime, attacker A could query the random oracles H1 by sending a random Pi, which is a prove-
nance fragment in an item of provenance, while the challenger B keeps a Hi-list recorded as < Pi, hi, aj , cj > to
answer the queries. The list is initially empty. When the attacker A sends Pi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as a query, the challenger B
calculates the following:
1. The challenger sends hi back directly as Hi(Pi) = hi ∈ G1 if Pi exists in the current list.
2. Or else, the challenger B chooses a random ci ∈ {0, 1}, with Pr[ci = 0] = 1/(q2 + 1).
3. Then, the challenger B generates a random ai ∈ Zp, and then computes hi ← u4 ∗ gai ∈ G1 if ci=0, and
hi ← gai ∈ G1 if ci=1.
4. Then the challenger adds the newly generated < Pi, hi, aj , cj > to the Hi-list and responds to the attacker hi.
H2-queries: The attacker A sends t as a H2 query, and the challenger picks a random V ∈ {0, 1}logp as H2(t) = V .
Adds the set (t, V) to the H2 list if this does not exist in the list previously. H2 is initially empty.
Trapdoor queries: The attackerA sends random Pi as trapdoor queries. Then the challenger calculates the following:
1. Run H1 query algorithm to obtain ci. If ci=0, it outputs failure and terminates.
2. If ci = 1, outputs Ti = uai1 as the result. Note that Ti = H(Pi)α as hi = gα. Then Ti = H(Pi)α = gaiα = uai1 .
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Challenge: The attacker A picks two provenance fragments P0 and P1 for the challenge. Note that both P0 and P1
should not have been challenged previously. The challenger B calculates PBCT as follows:
1. The challenger B runs H1-query algorithm to generate c0 and c1: if c0=1 and c1=1, reports failure and terminates;
if there is one between c0 and c1 equals 0, then it sets that one to cb; if both of them equal 0, then it randomly chooses
one of them to be cb.
2. Then it generates a challenge C for Pb as C = [u5, u6, J ], where J ∈ {0, 1}logp is a random number. The
challenger B defines J = H2(eˆ(H1(Pb)β , uγ1)) = H2(eˆ(u4gab , gαβγ)) = H2(eˆ(g, g)αβγ(δ+ab))
More trapdoor queries: The attacker could continue to ask trapdoor for Pi, where Pi 6= P0, P1.
Output: Finally, the attacker A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} which represents whether the challenge C is calculated for
P0 or P1. Then, the challenger chooses a random pair (t, V ) from H2 list and calculates t/eˆ(u5, u3)ab as the output
for eˆ(g, g)αβγδ , where ab is known as a parameter to calculate the challenge C.
For the simulation process described above, the probability that a challenger B correctly outputs eˆ(g, g)αβγδ is ′.
The challenger B wins the game if s/he chooses the correct H2 pair, and does not abort during the trapdoor queries
period and the challenge period.
Claim1 : The probability that a challenger outputs e(g, g)αβγδ is ′ = /(eq1q2).
Proof : Briefly, the challenger’s algorithm does not abort means that it does not abort during either the trapdoor queries
period or during the challenge period. The probability that a trapdoor query causes a challenger to abort is 1/(q2 + 1).
Because the attacker makes at most q2 trapdoor queries, the probability that the challenger does not abort at the trapdoor
queries phase is at least (1 − 1/(q2 + 1))qT ≥ 1/e. Similarly, it will abort at the challenge phase when c0 = c1 = 1
with Pr[c0 = c1 = 1] = (1 − 1/(q2 + 1))2 ≤ 1 − 1/q2. In the opposite way, it does not abort at the challenge
phase is at least 1/q2. Therefore, we have the corresponding probabilities are Pr[ξ1] ≥ 1/e and Pr[ξ2] ≥ 1/q2
respectively. Note that these two events are independent; therefore, the probability that the challenger’s algorithm
does not abort is Pr[ξ1 ∧ ξ2] ≥ 1/(eq2). Following that, the attacker A issues a query for H2(e(H1(Wb)β , uγ1))
with probability of at least ; then the challenger chooses the right pair with probability 1/q1. As these processes are
independent from one other, we can conclude that the probability that the challenger outputs eˆ(g, g)αβγδ is /eq1q2.
As this is a hard problem, the probability of the attacker can be able to break the game is negligible. In other words, the
attacker A cannot distinguish whether P0 or P1 is PBCT (Pb), hence the Provenance-based Classification Scheme is
semantic-secure.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a framework which can be used to classify encrypted files sent to the cloud. The
classification is made according to the provenance attached to the encrypted files. The provenance information itself
is in an encrypted form. The cloud server is able to check whether the provenance satisfies certain policies specified
by the administrator without decrypting the provenance. That is, the scheme allows searching encrypted provenance.
Furthermore, the cloud server is also able to check the identity of users who sent these files as that is part of the
provenance information. We have described the scheme in detail and developed a provenance-based classification
security game and proof to show that the proposed scheme is semantically secure based on a hard problem.
However, provenance-based access control is still at its initial stage. There is still interesting work to be done. That
will include the examination of the granularity of access control and the range of policy types that can be provided
using provenance. By employing provenance, access control systems might support more types of policies beyond the
traditional scope. In the meantime, uncertainties might arouse in the evaluation of provenance-based access control
policies, especially for a fine-grained approach. Then, conflict solutions might be required.
We also recognise that long-lived and much-handled data can acquire extensive provenance information. In prac-
tice, system administrators may need to limit the lifespan of provenance data if this is found to cause unacceptable
performance issues. Moreover, a scheme with adaptive semantic-security will improve the security level of the system.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we revisited a privacy-preserving third party auditing (TPA) cloud storage integrity checking protocol
and its extended version for zero knowledge public auditing (ZKPA). We showed several security weaknesses in these
protocols. It is still an open problem to design a ZKPA protocol that can prevent offline guessing attacks, and we leave
it as our future work.
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